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At Wisdom’s Table:                                                                                                                                       
How Narrative Shapes the Biblical Food Laws and their Social Function 
 
Abstract: The food laws of Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 are one of the great enigmas of 
biblical law. To understand them better I propose we see the food laws as a series of 
‘narrative paradigms’ aimed at a high-context society in which information is shared 
and internalised. This shared social knowledge raises the question of how the common 
environment of ancient Israel would make the categories intuitively clear. The narrative 
paradigms make sense because they reflect day-to-day engagement with the 
environment. The paradigm cases identify certain characteristics of a taxonomic group, 
which are then negated. The effect is to convey a complex body of knowledge about 
what can and cannot be eaten in an economical, unambiguous and practical manner. 
The laws build on each other, enabling the audience to accumulate knowledge as they 
progress through the different categories. In this way, the very construction of the 
categories clean and unclean – and hence the structure and presentation of the laws 
themselves – is shaped by practical wisdom. This is consistent with self-executing 
narrative rules elsewhere in biblical law. This reanalysis helps us to understand both 
the compositional strategy of the food laws and their social function. 
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At Wisdom’s Table: 
How Narrative Shapes the Biblical Food Laws and their Social Function  
 
The food laws of Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 are one of the great enigmas of biblical 
law. Prodigious efforts have been made since at least Philo’s time to identify rationales 
that might provide the basis for the choice of calling some creatures clean and others 
unclean.1 Yet for all the massive primary and secondary discussion, no conclusive 
explanation has so far emerged.2 To aid our understanding of the mode by which the 
laws are expressed I propose that we see the food laws as a series of ‘narrative 
paradigms.’3 I argue that this reanalysis helps us to understand both the compositional 
                                                          
I am grateful to Professor Bernard Jackson (Liverpool Hope), Professor Julian Rivers 
(Bristol) and JBL’s anonymous reviewers for their constructive engagement with, and 
comments upon, this paper. Biblical quotations are from the English Standard Version 
translation of the Holy Bible, unless otherwise noted.  
1 Philo of Alexandria, trans. F. H. Colson, The Special Laws, The Loeb Classical Library, 
vol. viii, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939), 69-81.  I am aware that 
some scholars (including, notably, Jacob Milgrom) favour the terms ‘pure’ and ‘impure’; 
however, I have used the language of ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ since this is preferred by most 
commentators and scholars, including most of those with whom I interact in this article.  
2 For an overview see Jiri Moskala, “Categorisation and evaluation of different kinds of 
interpretation of the laws of clean and unclean animals in Leviticus 11,” BR 2001 66, 5-
41.   
3 “Narrative paradigm” is a technical term grounded in a variety of semiotic disciplines. 
It refers to a form of sense-making, according to which the meaning of speech is evoked 
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strategy of the food laws and their social function.4 This reading contends that the 
biblical food laws identify typical or paradigmatic cases in a ‘high-context’ society where 
information is shared and internalised.5 This shared social knowledge raises the 
question of how the common environment of ancient Israel would make the categories 
of clean and unclean intuitively clear. I argue that the very construction of the categories 
clean and unclean – and hence the structure and presentation of the laws themselves – 
is shaped by practical wisdom, parallels to which can be found elsewhere in biblical 
law.6  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by the narrative images of typical situations within known social contexts (Bernard S. 
Jackson, Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1-22:16 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 24-25). It is discussed further in, I, below.  
 
4 This is different from the question of what purpose the laws served in the context of 
the YHWH/Israel covenant. Although I share the common view that the taxonomy of 
clean and unclean animals maps onto a division between Israel/non-Israel (Jacob 
Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16 (Anchor Bible Commentary; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 724-
725, and cf. Lev. 20:24b-26), nothing in the present article depends on this.  
5 In anthropology, a ‘high-context’ society or culture is one in which much is assumed or 
left unsaid and where, accordingly, the choice of words used is highly significant in 
communicating to a presumed ‘in-group.’ By contrast, in a ‘low-context’ society or 
culture the communicator needs to be much more explicit.   
6 Practical wisdom, in the context of biblical law, may be taken to refer to a popular, self-
executing approach to law in which dispute-resolution is aided by ‘rules of thumb’ and a 
somewhat pragmatic, ‘rough and ready’ approach to legal decision-making. For 
4 
I. A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO BIBLICAL LAW   
In doing so I am building on the work of Bernard S. Jackson who has argued, 
persuasively in my view, that biblical law is best understood in “narrative” rather than 
“semantic” terms.7 The dominant paradigm of “conventional meaning” today is “literal 
meaning,” which is closely tied, as its name suggests, to writing.8 A literal or “semantic” 
reading of any rule sees it as covering all cases that may be subsumed under the 
meaning of its words.  
 
However, there is another way of thinking about language and legal rules and this is to 
adopt a “narrative” approach. “Narrative” meaning consists of typical stories or images 
that are evoked by the use of words. It arises in the context of a group that shares the 
social knowledge necessary to evoke those images, without needing to “spell them out.”9  
Whereas a semantic interpretation asks, ‘what is the literal meaning of the words?’ a 
narrative approach asks, ‘what typical situations do the words of this rule evoke’? This 
means that the narrative image represents the ‘core’ of the message: thus, the further 
one departs from the typical case, the less sure we can be that the message is intended 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
examples, see Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, 20, 31, 239, 366, 403, 478 and see IV, below, for 
further discussion.  
7 Bernard S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law (JSOTSS 314; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 70-92 and Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, passim.  
8 Jackson, Studies, 14. 
9 Ibid., 45.  
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to apply or would be regarded as applicable by the audience.10 Although Jackson himself 
does not make this claim, the advantage of his approach is that it takes seriously the fact 
that the biblical laws function in a ‘high-context’ society where “most of the information 
or message… is either in the physical context or internalised in the person, while very 
little is in the coded, explicit transmitted part of the message.”11 Jackson’s theory has 
been developed in relation to a specific part of the biblical legal collections, namely, the 
‘Covenant Code’; whether it applies more widely must be addressed on an individual 
basis. This raises the question of whether the biblical food laws should be regarded as 
‘narrative paradigms’ or ‘paradigm cases.’ It is not an idle question. One of the most 
difficult aspects of the food laws has traditionally been the formulation of Deut 14:19-20 
which states: 
 
“And all winged insects are unclean for you; they shall not be eaten.  
All clean winged things you may eat.”  
 
Might the historical difficulties with reading this text have something to do with the 
projection of an anachronistic ‘semantic’ reading? If so, might a ‘narrative’ reading be 
more fruitful? It is certainly the case that verses 19-20 are problematic from a semantic 
perspective; thus, Jacob Milgrom describes them as a “cryptic generalisation.”12 Worse, 
as many have noted, the verses seem to contradict each other. Verse 19 apparently 
                                                          
10 Bernard S. Jackson, “Modelling biblical law,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 
(1995):1745-1827, here 1767-1768. 
11 E. T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 91-92.  
12 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 699.  
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makes a blanket statement banning all “winged insects,” without qualification, as being 
“unclean.” However, verse 20 goes straight on to say that there are “winged things” 
which are “clean,” which is not what verse 19 explicitly says. From a modern, semantic, 
point of view, it looks like bad draftsmanship.  
Gordon McConville thinks that Deut. 14:20 presupposes “some body of assumed 
knowledge such as Lev 11:21-22”13 whilst Richard D. Nelson states that Deut 14:20 “can 
only be understood in light of Lev 11:20-23, where it is clear that edible insects (locusts) 
are meant”14 (emphasis added). Such claims are based on the assumption that the food 
laws in Leviticus are prior to those in Deuteronomy.15 However, even if we accept that 
                                                          
13 Gordon McConville, (Deuteronomy, AOTC; Leicester: Apollos, 2002), 244. 
14 Richard D. Nelson, Deuteronomy (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2002), 180.  
15 The idea of direct literary dependence (in either direction) contrasts with the 
dominant view among scholars that Lev 11:2-32 and Deut 14:3-20 represent separate 
developments of a common source (e.g. S. R. Driver, Deuteronomy (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1901), 163-164; John E. Hartley (WBC 4; Waco: Word Books, 1992), 156-157; 
Walter C. Houston, Purity and Monotheism (JSOTSS 140; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 
63-65; Thomas Kazen, Emotions in Biblical Law (HBM 36; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press, 2011), 77; Naphtali S. Meshel, “Pure, Impure, Permitted, Prohibited: A Study of 
Classification Systems in P” in Perspectives on Purity and Purification in the Bible (eds. 
Baruch J. Schwartz et al.; London: T&T Clark, 2008, 32-42), here 33 and Christophe 
Nihan, “The laws about clean and unclean animals in Leviticus and Deuteronomy and 
their place in the formation of the Pentateuch,” in The Pentateuch: International 
Perspectives on Current Research (eds. Thomas B. Dozeman et al. FAT 78. Tübingen: 
7 
Deuteronomy is later, it does not follow that just because we presume that Lev 11:21-22 
was necessary to fill in the detail of Deut 14:20, this was also true for the audience of 
Deut 14:20. Indeed, the assumption that a particular law could only have made sense to 
the original audience if it was explicitly spelt out in another piece of legislation is a 
classic example of a semantic approach. We can at least raise the possibility that Deut 
14:20 could make (better) sense when read narratively. In any case, it cannot be 
sufficient to locate the answer to the problem of Deut. 14:20 by appealing to Leviticus 
because similar problems are found in Lev 11 itself! For example, it is frequently noted 
that Lev 11:13-19 “fails to offer any criterion of edibility”16 in regard to birds, which is 
to concede that Lev 11 can be as “elliptical” as Deut 14:20. This is all part of the reason 
for needing to move beyond a semantic reading of these texts.   
 
Certainly, the picture changes when the text is viewed from a narrative perspective. If 
the classification of clean and unclean insects in Lev 11:20-23 and Deut 14:19-20 is 
constructed as narrative typifications; viz. as typical images that make sense according 
to a shared body of social knowledge, then the typical image of the ‘unclean winged 
insect’ is the flightless insect that crawls “on all fours” whereas the stereotypical picture 
of the ‘clean winged insect’ is one that flies in the air. There is therefore no difficulty in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 401-432, here 431, though the latter’s assumptions about what 
the ‘original’ classification should have comprised are inevitably speculative). This 
dominant view is itself coming under increasing challenge with Nihan himself noting (at 
402-404) recent suggestions of direct literary dependence between Lev 11 and Deut 14.  
16 Houston, Purity, 43. 
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making sense of the provisions. The laws make perfect sense because the relevant 
background social knowledge is assumed by the legislator.  
 
Lest critics find this unpersuasive I need only point out there is a clear parallel 
elsewhere in biblical law. Exod 22:2-3 (MT 22:1-2), concerns the liability of a 
householder for using force against a burglar:  
 
If the thief is seized while tunnelling [through or under a wall for housebreaking] and he 
is beaten to death [by the householder], there is no bloodguilt in his case [that is, on the 
part of the householder]. If the sun has risen on him, there is bloodguilt in that case [on 
the part of the householder]. 
 
If we take a modern semantic approach to this case, then the drafting of verses 2 and 3 
seems odd and contradictory. The first part of the rule apparently gives carte blanche to 
the householder who kills an intruder at any time of day or night, while the second part 
of the rule denies self-help if the break-in occurs during the day. However, the text 
makes perfect sense if we take a narrative approach and ask “what is the typical 
situation evoked by the words “tunnelling thief?” Even if we could not make the 
appropriate connections ourselves, we know from elsewhere in the biblical texts that 
thieves typically tunnelled into other people’s houses at night (e.g. Job 24:14–16). In 
other words, from a narrative perspective, it is clear that the typical situation evoked by 
the words in Exodus 22:2 (MT 22:1) is one in which the thief tunnels at night. There is 
therefore no tension with the subsequent part of the rule which contrasts the legitimate 
action of the householder at night with the illegitimate action of the householder by 
9 
day.17 Just as the audience of Exod 22:2 supplies to the text “If the thief is seized while 
tunnelling at night…”, so the audience of Deut 14:19 supplies “… all winged and flightless 
insects are unclean….” There is thus a precedent for reading Deut 14:19-20 narratively.  
 
We thus proceed to the next step of our hypothesis. If I am on the right lines in saying 
that a narrative reading can make better sense of one part of the biblical food laws, the 
question arises whether it works for all the other categories as well. This is the focus of 
the next section.  
 
 
II. A NARRATIVE APPROACH TO THE BIBLICAL FOOD LAWS 
Scholars have occasionally noted that some verses appear to contain “principles” or 
“criteria” whilst other verses have “examples” and “lists.”18 However, there has not been 
much reflection on whether these terms adequately describe the legal reasoning at 
work in the texts, or even how these different elements are synthesised to produce a 
certain kind of sense. In my view, this is one of the most interesting features of Lev 11:3-
                                                          
17 Jackson, Studies, 75-81. 
18 E.g. Hartley (at 153) characterises different aspects of the composition of Lev 11:2-23 
as “principles” (vv. 2b-8); “general statements without any examples” (vv. 9-12); a lack 
of principles (vv. 13-19) and an “initial statement” followed by “an exception” (vv. 20-
23). Others such as Martin Noth observe that various categories are “differently 
phrased” but do not explore the matter (e.g. Leviticus, London: SCM Press, 1977, 93). 
10 
23 and Deut 14:3-20.19 As has frequently been noted, both Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-
20 cover similar ground.20 But whilst the substantive similarities between the two 
documents are frequently recognised, it is less commonly observed that the texts share 
remarkable structural similarities. In both documents some information is explicitly 
communicated about the creatures whilst other information is taken for granted (see 
Table 1, below).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Of course, these structural similarities could be explained on purely source critical 
grounds with one text being a fairly straightforward copy of the other.21 Yet even if this 
is the case, we still need to account for the structure of whatever is assumed to be the 
prior text. Thus, despite the importance of the literary origins of the food laws, my 
                                                          
19 Clearly, these sections are embedded in more complex literary structures, but for 
reasons of space I will concentrate on these verses.   
20 Though there remains uncertainty about identifying some of the creatures (Gerhard 
Von Rad, Deuteronomy, London: SCM, 1966, 102) and cf. the summary given by Houston, 
Purity, 29-32.  For recent summaries of possible literary histories see Thomas Hieke 
(Levitikus 1-15, HTKAT Freiburg: Herder, 2014), 416-417 and Christophe Nihan, “The 
laws about clean and unclean animals”, 401-432. Nihan assumes the origins of the food 
laws lay in exile; however exile was the hardly the only historical situation or social 
setting that could have produced a concern for ethnic markers by Jews.    
21 E.g. Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 698-704.  
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purpose in this article is to elucidate the structural and compositional significance of the 
food laws in respect of their final form.  
 
My proposal is that we can understand the food laws better if we see them as examples 
of ‘paradigm cases.’22 We will test this hypothesis by reference to each category in turn.  
 
(i) Land animals 
First, the land animals of Lev 11:3-8 and Deut 14:4-8. These have presented particular 
difficulties for commentators. For example, Richard D. Nelson complains that the 
catalogue of unclean animals is not complete and ignores, for example, the “unclean ass” 
(Exod 34:20).23 However, this is only problematic if one takes a modern, semantic, 
approach. Under a paradigmatic approach it hardly matters that the law is incomplete 
and that certain animals are not mentioned. Similarly, W. H. Bellinger Jr., in claiming 
that “the categorisation [of clean land animals] is probably not as clear as the text would 
suggest….”24 assumes that this is so because it does not formulate matters in the manner 
of a modern legal rule. But we do not have to assume a lack of clarity. It might be the 
case that, on a narrative reading, the text is perfectly clear as to the scope of the 
paradigm.    
 
                                                          
22 Scholars occasionally characterise the criteria for identifying clean animals as a 
‘paradigm’ or ‘template.’ This is some distance from identifying the laws as narrative 
paradigms or paradigm cases, as discussed in I above.    
23 Nelson, Deuteronomy, 180. 
24 W. H. Bellinger, Jr. Leviticus and Numbers (NIBC; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2001), 74. 
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In fact, both Lev 11:3 and Deut 14:6 explicitly tell us that the narrative paradigm, or 
typical image, of the clean animal is one that has split hooves and chews the cud; viz. an 
animal that eats grass. The question why this is the typical image of the clean animal is a 
separate matter which we will consider in III, below. Having established this image the 
next move is the negation of the paradigm case by means of a ‘binary opposition.’ 25  
Thus, animals which do not have cleft hooves and do not chew the cud are ‘unclean.’ 
Setting out an explicit paradigm of what is clean – which implies a paradigm of what is 
unclean – is highly efficient teaching. Nothing is explicitly said about the enormous 
category of animals which do not have cleft hooves and which do not chew the cud – 
reckoned to be about 90% of all species of Middle Eastern mammals26 – because 
nothing needs to be said. It is implied social knowledge: the paradigm of the clean 
animal is simply flipped around. The creation of a narrative paradigm which is simply 
inverted means that an animal which belongs to one category can never belong to the 
other. The way in which the food laws are constructed thus provide complete clarity. In 
fact, it is precisely because the audience has already internalised the paradigm of the 
                                                          
25 See Hunn, “Abominations,” 108.  ‘Binary oppositions’ are a form of semantic relations. 
They refer to a pair of terms that are conventionally, and not necessarily logically, 
regarded as opposites (e.g. ‘black/white’; ‘day/night’ and ‘wet/dry’). Their construction 
is dependent on social context: it is this which determines whether the appropriate 
opposition of a ‘boy’ is a ‘girl’ or a ‘man.’ Binary oppositions are an important aspect of 
sense-making. As Jackson, Wisdom-Laws notes: “Classifications appear natural or 
intelligible where we have a correlation of normally associated binary oppositions…” 
(259).  
26 See Table 6 of Hunn, “Abominations,” 113.          
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unclean animal that the legislator can subsequently reel off examples of unclean 
animals, at verse 29, including the “mole rat” and the “mouse.” But they are there for 
illustration only. We do not need a list of the other 90% of unclean animals because the 
paradigm case of the clean animal has already done the work.27 As a form of legal 
reasoning, it is remarkably effective.  
 
What about land animals which either (a) chew the cud but don’t have hooves, or (b) 
have hooves but don’t chew the cud? This is addressed in Lev 11:4-8 and Deut 14:7-8. In 
terms of legal reasoning, it seems that these are deliberately presented as ‘hard cases.’28 
They are ‘half one thing and half another’ so their status cannot be deduced either from 
the explicit paradigm of what is clean or the implied paradigm of what is ‘unclean.’ 
                                                          
27 Despite Nelson’s concern regarding lack of completeness, this narrative reading 
strengthens and redefines his view (at 180) that the references to unclean animals in 
Deut 14:7-8 are “representative examples to show the reader how to apply the template 
of verse 6.” Kunin (2004:41) rightly spots that the permitted animals mentioned are 
“only examples of a more general class” though does not see this in terms of a narrative 
paradigm.  
28 Kunin (2004:41) comes close in seeing “[t]he lists of ambiguous examples… as 
examples of where to place difficult cases.” Interestingly Kunin’s comments regarding 
the anomaly in structuralist thought – here, where animals have one characteristic but 
not another – apply equally well to hard cases. Like anomalies, hard cases are not 
intrinsic. And just as different systems give rise to different types of anomaly, so 
different laws and forms of legal interpretation create different types of hard case (cf. 
Kunin, ibid).   
14 
Accordingly, Lev 11:4-7 and Deut 14:7-8 confirm that the clean animal must have both 
elements of the paradigm (i.e. hooves and chews the cud). If one element is missing, the 
paradigm is negated and the animal is regarded as unclean.29 The use of hard cases thus 
reinforces the narrative paradigms of clean and unclean.  
 
(ii)  Aquatic creatures 
Second, we turn to the aquatic creatures of Lev 11:9-12 and Deut 14:9-10. A semantic 
approach can be seen in Houston’s claim that the sub-section on aquatic creatures is 
“highly redundant”30 in Leviticus, presumably because of the lack of detail. Gerhard Von 
Rad sees the aquatic creatures, as with all the categories, as drawing on earlier “lists”31 
and “catalogues” whilst Erhard S. Gerstenberger supposes that the redactor of Deut 
14:9f lacked access to “more specific instructions”32 which, he implies, would have been 
necessary and desirable.    
 
A narrative approach, on the other hand, works as follows. As with the land animals, Lev 
11:9 and Deut 14:9 establish the paradigm of the clean aquatic creature: “Everything in 
the waters that has fins and scales…” (italics added). However, unlike the land animals, 
                                                          
29 In Lev 11:4-7 and Deut 14:7-8 each element of the paradigm case of the clean animal 
is explicitly negated by the appropriate binary opposition (either “it chews the cud but 
does not part the hoof…”; Lev 11:6 = Deut 14:7 or “it parts the hoof and is cloven-footed 
but does not chew the cud…”; Lev 11:7 = Deut 14:8).  
30 Houston, Purity, 234-235.  
31 Von Rad, Deuteronomy, 101.  
32 Erhard S. Gerstenberger. Leviticus. (London: Westminster, 1993 tr. 1996), 137.  
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the clean paradigm is explicitly negated in Lev 11:10, 12 and Deut 14:10. The unclean 
aquatic creature is “anything in the seas or the rivers that does not have fins and 
scales…” (italics added; Lev 11:10).  
 
What about the handling of hard cases, viz. aquatic creatures which have ‘scales but not 
fins’, or ‘fins but not scales’? We already know from the treatment of ‘half and half’ land 
animals that if one element is missing, the paradigm is negated and the creature is 
unclean. I suggest it is for this reason that nothing is said about hard cases here. The 
audience has already internalised this from what has been said about land animals. For 
this reason, the paradigm of the unclean aquatic creatures does not need to be 
articulated. The audience can work out the paradigm for themselves on the basis of the 
foregoing. As such it can be said to be a substantive implicit paradigm. The subsequent 
content of Lev 11:29-30 makes sense against this background. Lev 11:29-30 reels off a 
list of ‘half and half’ aquatic creatures, including “the great lizard of any kind, the gecko, 
the monitor lizard, the lizard, the sand lizard, and the chameleon” – all creatures that 
have scales (as fish do) but do not live in water.33 The purpose of the list is to confirm 
what the audience has already been told, implicitly, that they are all ‘unclean.’    
 
(iii) Birds 
Third, the birds, as described in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18. Again, we may briefly 
note some of the semantic assumptions made by commentators. Thus Martin Noth says, 
of the clean birds: “Naturally they included all not in the list of the forbidden [birds]” 
                                                          
33 Hunn, “Abominations,” 113. 
16 
(italics added),34 an assumption shared by Thomas Hieke.35 Similarly, Jeffrey H. Tigay 
states that it is generally presumed that all birds which are not listed as impure were 
permissible.36 All claim that the lists in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18 are closed; that 
is, they only contain the listed birds,  irrespective of the possibility of there being similar 
unclean birds which have yet to be considered by jurists. But why presume that the list 
of unclean birds is exhaustive? This assumption is only ‘natural’ on a semantic 
approach. Houston likewise assumes that the list "must be comprehensive, and 
therefore includes creatures that nobody who was not starving can have any mind to 
eat, such as hoopoes and bats!”37 Again, this reading makes semantic assumptions, 
namely, that the law must be closed and exhaustive, even to the extent of including 
things which are irrelevant to people’s diets. However, the idea that the lawgiver would 
include useless information is not in keeping with the economical style of Torah.  
 
A narrative approach, once again, would read the texts differently. Unlike the aquatic 
creatures, there is no explicit paradigm of either the clean bird or the unclean bird. 
Instead, we are given a list of unclean birds in both Lev 11 and Deut 14. This presumes 
there is a shared background understanding of what counts as a clean and an unclean 
bird. This is especially clear in Deuteronomy 14:11, which states, “You may eat all clean 
                                                          
34 Noth, Leviticus, 94. 
35 Hieke, Levitikus, 424. 
36 Tigay, Deuteronomy (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 139. 
37 Houston, Purity, 236. Contra Kunin (2004:86) who recognises that “the Deuteronomic 
text… is meant to establish a forbidden category, which is extendable to other flying 
animals.” 
17 
birds.” It is another example of legal reasoning in a ‘high-context’ society – it simply 
assumes the audience knows what a clean bird is. Fortunately for us, we can deduce the 
image of the clean bird because it is simply opposed to the unclean bird. The clean bird 
is one that has feathers, flies, and eats what a bird normally eats (berries, insects and so 
on). What sets the norm here? One reason why the paradigm of the clean bird is implicit 
is because it has already been derived from the fact that the clean land animals are 
herbivorous. Herbivorous land animals set the norm for the (unarticulated) paradigm of 
the clean bird.  
 
Thus, against Noth, Tigay and Houston, the lists in Lev 11:13-19 and Deut 14:11-18 may 
be said to contain representative illustrations of the unarticulated paradigm of the 
unclean bird. The ‘list’ is thus open and non-exhaustive. This means that if, for the sake 
of argument, the Israelites came across a new species of bird which was sufficiently 
similar to the unarticulated paradigm of the unclean bird, it would be regarded as 
unclean even though it is not expressly included in “the list.” In my view, Nelson is 
wrong to suggest that the list is for “rhetorical emphasis more than practical 
application.”38 From a narrative perspective, the laws relating to birds are just as 
practical as the other categories because they educate the audience about what are 
typically to be regarded as clean and unclean creatures. 
 
Houston39 and Nelson40 both object that the passage in Lev 11:13-19 fails to offer any 
criterion of edibility. Instead, they “only” 41 provide a list of some kinds of bird that are 
                                                          
38 Nelson, Deuteronomy, 180. 
39 Houston, Purity, 43. 
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not to be eaten. But from a narrative perspective there is nothing only about a list. This 
is because the list itself can be seen as supplying the criteria. It is the visual images 
summoned by the words in the list which evoke an implicit paradigm of the unclean 
bird.42 The list of unclean birds is thus a series of worked examples of an unarticulated 
paradigm case of the unclean bird,43 viz., a bird that doesn’t have feathers, or doesn’t fly, 
or doesn’t eat what birds normally eat.44 The images thus confirm what the audience 
has already internalised. The dominant assumption is that if the birds eat what you 
don’t eat then you can eat them. But if they eat what you can eat (i.e. land animals and 
fish) then you can’t eat them. It is very simple because it is just the same test, flipped 
around. Once again, the laws are an extremely effective and efficient teaching tool.   
 
It may be significant that the list of unclean birds, in both Lev 11 and Deut 14, begins 
with those birds that eat land animals because animals are the subject of the first 
category of creatures in both Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 (see (i), above). It then 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40 Nelson, Deuteronomy, 180.   
41 Ibid. 
42 Contra Houston, Purity, 236 who claims that we are only given information about 
birds because of an “impulse for comprehensiveness….”   
43 Although there remains some uncertainty regarding the identification of some birds 
in the list (see S. R. Driver, A Critical and Exegetical commentary on Deuteronomy, 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996, 162-163 and Houston, Purity, 43-46). 
44 It may be the case that the birds are actually hard cases in the sense that, although 
they have feathers and fly, they don’t eat what clean birds eat, and so they negate one of 
the key characteristics.  
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moves on to birds which eat fish, because they are the subject of the second category 
(see (ii), above). We have already noted how the ‘set-up’ of prior blocks of material 
helps to structure later information (e.g. the handling of ‘hard cases’ and equating clean 
with ‘herbivorous’). The ordering of the unclean birds would thus be a further example 
of this internal structuring.  
 
The bat is presumably included, and placed last, because the absence of feathers, 
together with its live young, means it is visually farthest from the paradigm of the clean 
bird. Stereotypical images are affective and draw on a range of senses including, most 
importantly, sight. The bat negates different characteristics of the clean bird to others 
on the list because although the bat eats what clean birds eat, it looks nothing like 
them.45 As such, it presents the reverse problem to all the other unclean birds in the list.  
 
(iv) Insects  
Finally, the insects. The category of insects presents commentators with similar 
difficulties to those we have already seen for birds, in (iii) above. For Tigay “the 
permitted and forbidden winged animals are not distinguished by easily observable 
external characteristics. Hence, no general rule is given for distinguishing among them, 
                                                          
45 What about the hoopoe? It is further removed from the stereotypical image of the 
clean bird than other birds on the list because not only is it omnivorous, it also has a 
reputation for being particularly smelly, making its nests out of dung and rubbish. 
However, it is not as far removed from the clean paradigm as the bat because it still 
does at least still look like a bird.  
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but only a list identifying the impure ones.”46 But as noted in relation to birds, there is 
nothing “only” about a list when it illustrates an assumed paradigm. A narrative 
perspective would therefore view things differently; the list exists because there is a 
paradigm.  
 
Houston, once again, seems to adopt a semantic approach to this category by claiming 
insects were included because of the lawgiver’s “impulse for comprehensiveness….”47 
By contrast, a narrative reading would not expect an exhaustive account. Further, he 
states that Deut 14:19, which he sees as “the original form of the prohibition,” 48 had the 
unfortunate effect of excluding locusts, which were an important supplement to the 
Israelite diet. However, the idea that Deut 14:19 fails to permit locusts is, again, an 
example of a semantic approach. It assumes the verse is to be read as a ban on all 
“winged insects,” without qualification. This is contrary to the narrative reading of “all”, 
advanced in (ii) above. Houston also assumes that Deut 14:19 conflicted with customary 
dietary practice. This again contrasts with my approach which sees narrative 
typifications as drawing on social knowledge, which, in this case, would include the 
desirability of eating locusts as a source of concentrated protein (see IV below). In my 
view, there is no need to see Deut 14:19 as being ‘reversed’ by the subsequent law in 
Leviticus, as per the manner of a modern statute. Both Lev 11 and Deut 24 make sense 
against a shared body of social knowledge, which includes customary dietary practice.  
 
                                                          
46 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 139. 
47 Houston, Purity, 236. 
48 Ibid.  
21 
In setting out a narrative approach to this category, we will concentrate on Lev 11:20-
23 because it is more detailed than Deut 14:19-20, which has already been discussed, in 
II above. The text begins with an explicit paradigm case of the unclean insect; that which 
goes “on all fours” (Lev 11:20; italics added). However, if we flip this around, it provides 
an implied paradigm of a clean insect, namely, something that flies around and “does 
not go on all fours.” As with the clean birds, Leviticus simply assumes this is part of the 
audience’s social knowledge. As we saw in II, above, this assumption is also taken for 
granted in Deut 14:20.  
 
Lev 11:21 is interesting because, for the first time, we are told of an exception to the 
category of the unclean (“… among the winged insects that go on all fours you may eat 
those that have jointed legs above their feet, with which to hop on the ground”; italics 
added). ‘Leaping’ insects are potentially ‘hard cases’ because they, too, are ‘halfway 
house’ creatures. They ‘go upon all fours’ but can also get airborne for brief periods. So 
far in the food laws, we have been told that if a creature negates just one of the 
characteristics of the clean paradigm they are to be regarded as ‘unclean.’ We saw this 
was the case for land animals and aquatic creatures (and possibly even for birds as 
well). However, contrary to expectations, Lev 11:21 states that the leaping insects are 
not to be regarded as unclean. They are deemed to be sufficiently close to the paradigm 
of ‘clean flying things’ because they can get airborne. Another reason why they may be 
deemed close to the paradigm is because the classic example of ‘leaping’ creatures, 
locusts, are herbivorous. We have already noted the herbivorous paradigm for clean 
animals and birds in (i) and (ii), above. 
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Some scholars may have reservations about reading Lev 11:3, 9 and Deut 14:6, 9 as 
‘narrative paradigms,’ or ‘typical images,’ when – at least on the surface – they provide 
definitional criteria which are not attached to a particular (animal or aquatic) paradigm 
or image. However my argument still stands because the ‘definitional criteria’ of Lev 
11:3 and Deut 14:6 still make the implied audience think of something. Even today, 
definitional formulae do not exist purely as abstractions but function in relation to other 
things with which they are associated. Part of the justification for claiming this is that 
there is evidence, in biblical law, that rule elaboration and systematisation does not 
exclude wider, popular, associations. For example, Num 35:16 certainly has clear 
definitional criteria, so much so that David Daube49 identified it as an example of the 
‘diagnosis’ form. Yet the definitional element does not exclude the operation of ‘gut 
feelings,’ reflected in labeling the killer “a murderer.”  
 
A critic might object that Lev. 11:9 and Deut. 14:9 are different, given their use of the 
word ‘all.’ However, we cannot exclude the possibility of applying a narrative rather 
than a semantic approach even in the presence of the word לכ (“everything”). After all, 
there is no reason why we should be expected to take the word לכ literally. Even today, 
if reference is made in modern legislation to “all” or “everything,” its meaning is quickly 
revised and restricted in the event of an unforeseen or atypical case. Accordingly, I 
contend that we can still talk about the dietary laws in terms of ‘narrative paradigms,’ or 
‘typical images,’ when – at least on the surface – they provide definitional criteria.  
 
                                                          
49 David Daube, Ancient Jewish Law (Brill, 1981), 100-106.  
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Before concluding this section we must acknowledge that positing a narrative approach 
to the biblical food laws raises certain questions about the development of legal drafting 
at this stage in the history of biblical law. We noted in I, above, that Jackson’s conceptual 
model regarding biblical law and ‘narrative’ was developed in relation to the Mishpatim, 
or ‘Covenant Code.’ There, Jackson claims to find a relationship between narrative forms 
of sense construction and the oral underpinnings of the Mishpatim.50 Jackson contends 
that this ‘oral residue’ is  not completely overlaid, even when the stage of writing has 
been reached.51 The question arises whether we might find examples of such oral 
residue outside the Mishpatim. One might suppose that a priestly work such as Leviticus 
would be one of the less likely places in which to find such evidence, given the 
‘bureaucratic mode’ of the priestly genre and its particular concern for classification. 
For example, the ‘diagnosis’ form noted by Daube, above, occurs only in Priestly sources 
showing the emerging importance of classification inasmuch as “the legal consequences 
are impliedly derived not directly from the facts, but from the categorization of the facts 
as falling within an accepted legal class.”52 Indeed, Jackson himself cites Lev 11:4 as an 
example of the diagnosis pattern.53 The movement from oral residue to classification 
could be regarded as part of a movement from one form of legal reasoning (concrete 
thinking) to another (abstract thought).54  
 
                                                          
50 Jackson, Studies, 70-92.  
51 Ibid., 93-113.  
52 Ibid., 96. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.   
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If I am on the right lines in suggesting that the food laws are best understood as 
narrative paradigms then not only do we have examples of such cases in Lev 11 and 
Deut 14, we may also have an example of ‘oral residue’ evident, not only at the stage of 
writing, but also (in the context of Leviticus) at an advanced stage of legal reasoning as 
well.55 My point is that, although the priestly text may reflect a more analytical approach 
– as befits the professional milieux and internal purposes of the priesthood56 – we do 
not have to assume that this element of professional ‘group thinking’ or language 
completely overlays the concrete images underlying the classificatory rules. This means 
that we can still talk about the dietary laws in terms of ‘narrative paradigms,’ or ‘typical 
images,’ when – at least on the surface – they provide definitional criteria. In fact, in the 
form we have them, the dietary laws are interesting for our understanding of the 
possible development of biblical law inasmuch as they reflect concrete, customary 
norms and a classificatory schema.  Perhaps – and this is a matter of conjecture – the 
                                                          
55 I am grateful to Bernard Jackson for drawing this to my attention. Jackson himself has 
argued extensively for the notion of narrative underpinnings of analytical language, for 
example, Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Liverpool: Deborah 
Charles Publications, 1988), 101-106; Bernard S. Jackson, Making Sense in Jurisprudence 
(Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1996), 199-200, 208, 240-245; and now also 
Bernad Jackson. 2013. “On the values of Biblical law and their contemporary 
application”, Political Theology, 14:602-618, 612, at n. 46.    
56 This is not to assume, however, that priestly writings are to be thought of as being 
directed only towards the priests: parts of Leviticus, for example, are said to be directed 
at the ‘person in the street’ who needs to know, for example, what sacrifice they are 
supposed to bring on what occasion (e.g. Leviticus 1-5). 
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food laws in Leviticus and Deuteronomy are an example of what happens when 
customary rules are presented with a bureaucratic ‘spin’?  
 
To sum up, we have seen that whereas the biblical food laws in Lev 11 and Deut 14 are 
problematic when understood in semantic terms, they make very good sense when 
understood in narrative terms. I have proposed that their literary form should be 
understood as narrative ‘paradigm cases’, which includes binary oppositions. Their  
paradigmatic character can be seen in the way in which the food laws proceed by 
identifying certain characteristics of a taxonomic group which are then negated. Once 
established, the binary opposite is stated to identify the unclean, but this category is 
already implied in identifying the clean. This illustrates implied social knowledge which 
does not require the exhaustive listing of cases because the paradigm case of the clean 
creature has already done the work. The different categories build on each other which, 
in turn, assumes that the audience accumulates knowledge as the laws progress. As the 
categories accumulate so the audience can work out the laws for themselves on the 
basis of what they have already been told.   
 
 
III. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 
Having argued that the food laws make sense as narrative paradigms which depend on 
social knowledge, the question then arises as to what particular sources of social 
knowledge could make the various paradigm cases seem intuitively clear? Although 
nothing in my argument in I-II, above, depends on identifying such sources, it is worth 
considering this question. Apart from anything else it will remind us that narrative 
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paradigms do not simply arise from nowhere. It takes a particular worldview and 
mindset to make certain things appear ‘natural’ or ‘obvious.’ 57    
 
Before going further, it is worth emphasising that I am using ‘social knowledge’ as an 
aspect of sense-construction. It is relevant to the ‘thematic level’ (one of the ‘basic 
structures of signification’) and helps us to make sense of data encountered at the ‘level 
of manifestation’; viz. that which is presented to our senses and the particular meaning 
attributed to it. Social knowledge thus derives from the environment in which we live, 
being implicit in the ‘level of manifestation’ itself.58 It is also organised narratively being 
commonly stored and transmitted as “(substantive) narrative stereotypes, themes, 
[and] images of typifications of action.”59 
 
It goes without saying that ‘the narrative organisation of material deriving from the 
environment’ can include a great deal. It should be obvious, therefore, that when it 
comes to identifying possible sources of social knowledge that might be relevant, I am 
not ruling out any particular sort of data. All sorts of phenomena, including texts and 
traditions, could potentially be relevant in identifying the social knowledge that might 
have made the paradigm cases seem natural. However, it is not enough to posit that 
                                                          
57 As Umberto Eco writes: “One (if not the most important) of the semiotic endeavours 
is to explain why something looks intuitive…” (Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the 
Philosophy of Language (London: Macmillan, 1984)), 9.  
 
58 Jackson, Studies, 25. 
59 Ibid.  
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such-and-such a phenomenon was part of the original audience’s environment, and 
hence their social knowledge. That is not the relevant question. The question is whether 
this sort of social knowledge could plausibly be said to generate this set of narrative 
paradigms? This is quite a specific test, as we are about to see, thanks to a couple of 
examples.  
 
I begin by drawing on data which leading scholars working and writing on the food laws 
have suggested is part of the social world inhabited by, or presupposed by, ancient 
Israelites.60 First – and consistent with Mary Douglas’ analysis – we could say that 
empirical observation that certain creatures have a certain diet was part of ancient 
Israel’s implied social knowledge. 61 But whilst this is undoubtedly true, I do not see 
                                                          
60 It goes without saying that these scholars do not frame their theories in terms of the 
narrative method I have outlined. However, their attempts to find underlying 
‘principles’ to the food laws makes claims, whether recognised or not, regarding the 
social knowledge of the original audience.  
 
61 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 1966); and cf. also her 
subsequent iteration “Deciphering a Meal”, Daedalus 101 (1972):61-81. For a thorough 
critique of both accounts see Seth D. Kunin (We Think What We Eat, JSOTSS 412, 
London: T&T Clark), 31-62. Douglas herself took different directions in her later work 
(Mary Douglas, “Atonement in Leviticus,” JSQ 1993 1, 109-30; “The Forbidden Animals 
in Leviticus,” JSOT 1993 59:3-23 and Leviticus as Literature, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, 134-175) but these have not been persuasive (see recent critiques by 
Walter J. Houston, “Towards an integrated reading of the dietary laws of Leviticus”, in 
The Book of Leviticus: Composition and Reception (eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Robert A. 
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how this could, in itself, make the narrative paradigms in the food laws seem intuitively 
clear. On purely empirical grounds a bat, for example, could not be ‘naturally’ regarded 
as unclean when it eats what clean birds eat. Second – and consistent with Milgrom’s 
‘respect for life analysis’ – we could say that some underlying sense of social values 
(regardless of how ‘conceptual’ these might have been) was part of ancient Israel’s 
implied social knowledge. 62 Certainly we find plenty of places where such concern is 
reflected in both Leviticus and Deuteronomy themselves. But I do not see how this sort 
of social knowledge could plausibly have generated the particular narrative paradigms 
we find in the food laws. How could ‘respect for life’ produce a classification that 
encourages killing most types of fish for food or that makes specific exception to allow 
the consumption of locusts? Third – and consistent with Houston’s claim that ancient 
Israelite sanctuaries were the locus for developing the classification of clean and 
unclean animals63 – we could say that ritual or sacrificial practices were part of ancient 
Israel’s implied social knowledge. This claim too is incontestable. But again, this does 
not explain the paradigm cases of Lev 11 and Deut 14 since fish and insects were not 
offered for sacrifice in biblical Israel.64 It does not adequately explain why this social 
knowledge would make these categories of clean and unclean seem intuitively clear.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Kugler; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 142-161, here 150-157 and Leigh M. Trevaskis (Holiness, 
Ethics and Ritual in Leviticus HBM 29 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011), 71-79).   
62 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 718-736.  
63 Houston, Purity, 123. 
64 Trevaskis, Holiness, 244.  
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Fourth – and consistent with traditional readings which attempt to ground the 
distinction between clean and unclean creatures in some understanding of life in Eden65 
– we could say that ancient Israel’s own texts and traditions were part of her implied 
social knowledge. If, as I claim, the implied audience uses their social knowledge to ‘fill 
in’ gaps in the food laws there is no reason why this should exclude textual or mythical 
knowledge drawn from the environment. Even it were to be argued that Genesis 2-3 
played a significant role in biblical Israel’s social knowledge66 the notion that this 
background social knowledge could have generated this particular classification is 
harder to sustain.67 How could Edenic imagery, of whatever sort, naturally produce 
these – and only these – classifications? If Genesis 1-3 is so foundational, why is killing 
any creature for food acceptable? Should we not expect fruit (of whatever sort) to be 
taboo? It simply does not account for the detail in a consistent manner.  
 
My provisional conclusion, then, is that none of the sources of social knowledge that 
might be suggested by traditional approaches are plausible candidates for the 
interpretation of the narrative paradigms. Nevertheless, we still need to identify a 
                                                          
65   E.g. Wenham, Leviticus, 184,  Evan M. Zuesse, “Taboo and the Divine Order,” JAAR, 42 
(1974):482-504, 494 and Trevaskis, Holiness, 239. 
66 E.g. Trevaskis, Holiness, 93-101. However, whilst some interpreters might regard the 
tree of life in Proverbs, for example, as deriving from Gen. 2-3, most interpreters do not 
see it this way; instead regarding any such derivations, where they might exist, as late 
(as in the possible case of Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon).       
67 The criterion of vegetarianism hardly applies to herbivores which are deemed 
unclean, such as the rabbit. 
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plausible source.  It is not enough to assert (per Nelson) that the clean creatures are 
“conventional”68: the question is why are they conventional? We should recognise that 
when we make claims about the rationale for distinguishing between clean and unclean 
creatures, we are making assumptions, and claims, about the nature and content of 
biblical Israel’s social knowledge. Therefore, the traditional question of ‘what is the 
basis of the distinction between clean and unclean creatures?’ should be prefaced by 
asking, ‘what is it about these clean and unclean images that makes them appear 
dominant, and typical, in the context of biblical Israel’s social knowledge?’  
 
Whatever else may have contributed to biblical Israel’s social knowledge, it is certainly 
plausible to suggest that the physical world of ancient Israel is a relevant, if not the 
dominant, factor. Israel’s interaction with her physical environment is an eminently 
reasonable context for thinking about the sort of social knowledge that might give rise 
to a distinction between clean and ‘unclean.’ Some scholars, notably Eugene Hunn, have 
acknowledged the role of the physical environment in shaping Israel’s consciousness 
regarding the food laws;69 however, in the rest of this section, I want to link this to an 
understanding of the food laws as paradigm cases.  
 
Looking, first, at the land animals, it is easy to see how, among farmers, the stereotypical 
image of a clean animal would be ‘one that eats grass’ because it is the sort of animal 
they have most contact with. Accordingly, herbivores will ‘naturally’ be seen as the 
                                                          
68 Nelson, Deuteronomy, 177. 
69 Hunn, “Abominations.” 
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‘norm.’70 If one is developing a taxonomic system which distinguishes between clean 
and unclean it follows that clean animals will be herbivorous animals.71 The narrative 
paradigm is typical precisely because it reflects day-to-day engagement with the 
environment. Indeed, the order of clean animals in Deut 14:4-5 may reflect the fact that 
the three kinds of edible domesticated animals (“the ox, the sheep, the goat”) give rise, 
by association, to the seven kinds of edible wild animals (“the deer, the gazelle, the 
roebuck, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope, and the mountain sheep”). The 
background social knowledge here includes social practices, such as nomadic herding, 
which are an efficient way of operating environmentally. The paradigm case has 
intuitive appeal, in this context. And since the observable characteristics of the ‘norm’ 
regarding livestock are animals that have cleft hooves and chew the cud (Lev 11:3 = 
Deut 14:6) it follows, logically, and by implication, that animals which do not have cleft 
hooves and do not chew the cud are ‘unclean.’ On this assumption, carnivorous animals 
are labelled unclean because they are the binary opposite of a paradigm which is 
normative only because it reflects everyday practice. In keeping with this idea, the 
unclean animals of Deut 14:7 (the camel, the rabbit and the coney) appear in order of 
how far removed they are from the paradigm of everyday life.   
 
                                                          
70 Cf. the similar view of Douglas, Purity and Danger, 53-55, Houston, Purity, 110, 118 
and J. R. Porter, Leviticus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 84.   
71 As Hunn notes: “It is no accident that animals which chew their cud also have hooves 
– both characteristics favour adaptation to open grassland habitats, which in turn is 
associated with herding behaviour” (“Abominations,” 114).  
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In this respect, the rules may reflect an underlying distinction between ‘domesticated 
animals’ and ‘wild animals.’72 If so, it would not be altogether surprising. A similar 
opposition is found in the Covenant Code of Exodus (as well as in Roman and English 
law), which contrasts the case of the ‘wild’ goring ox (Exod 21:28-32, 35-36) with that of 
‘domesticated’ depasturation (Exod 22:4).73 The contrast between ‘tame’ and ‘wild’ 
animals might have particular resonance within Priestly circles because it evokes 
images from the primeval history. This may be the appropriate connection to make with 
the Eden story. Vegetarianism correlates with the original Adamic regime (Gen 2:18-20; 
where arguably all animals were ‘tame’, at least to Adam). It also contrasts with the 
Noahide covenant (Genesis 9:2-3); specifically, its permission of animal flesh and the 
threat to humans from wild animals.74 
 
Turning to the aquatic creatures, it is possible that the paradigm of the clean fish may be 
typical because ‘fins and scales’ reflect the kind of fish the Israelites were used to. In 
that sense, ‘fins and scales’ are the aquatic equivalent of ‘hooves and cud’ for land 
animals. This is a reasonable suggestion because this categorisation does in fact 
typically represent the vast majority of fish. Against this background, fish with ‘fins and 
scales’ are intuitively going to be seen as the ‘norm.’ Again, the paradigm appears typical 
because it reflects day-to-day engagement with the environment. Finally, turning to 
                                                          
72 I am grateful to Bernard Jackson for drawing this to my attention.  
73 Bernard S. Jackson, “Liability for Animals: An Historico-Structural Comparison,” 
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 24 (2011):259-289, here 279-80; Jackson, 
Studies, 193.  
74 I owe this point to Bernard Jackson.  
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birds and insects, it is possible, once again, that the narrative paradigm is typical 
because it reflects everyday interaction with the physical world and its constraints. The 
importance of material concerns in explaining why things are paradigmatic extends 
even to making an exception of hopping insects.75 Such insects may have been an 
essential source of protein, especially during a plague of locusts.76 Therefore, the locust 
is clean, despite its characteristics. The locust is thus an example of how an object is 
interpreted to fit the paradigm, rather than the paradigm being interpreted to fit the 
object.77 After all, narrative paradigms are not objective constructs; they are intrinsic 
only to the social knowledge that gives rise to them. Accordingly, there is no reason why 
an object such as the locust, cannot be interpreted creatively to bring it into the 
category of ‘clean’, if the economic or social reasons for doing so are sufficiently 
strong.78 This is what we would expect if the food laws are narrative paradigms that 
exemplify particular material practice.    
                                                          
75 Hunn, “Abominations,” 112, notes that locusts share with “ruminant ungulates the 
property of concentrating protein with exceptional efficiency….”  
76 Kunin (2004, 88). Cordelia Hebblethwaite, “Eating locusts: the crunchy kosher snack 
taking Israel by swarm.’ n.p. [cited 12 June 2015]. Online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-21847517.htm.   
77 Adapting Kunin’s formulation (2004, 34) on the relationship between an ‘object’ and 
a ‘system.’   
78 Cf. Kunin (2004, 48). Others have taken the view that the classification of locusts 
reflects Israelite social practice; Houston, Purity, 117; Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 666 and 
E. B. Firmage, “The biblical dietary laws and the concept of holiness,” in Studies in the 
Pentateuch (VTSup 41, ed. J. A. Emerton; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 177-208, here 192. 
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To sum up, I suggest that biblical Israel’s social knowledge is shaped by multiple social 
and environmental factors that in turn affect the categorisation of clean and unclean 
creatures. It is human engagement with the material environment that makes the 
narrative paradigms we find in the food laws appear dominant, and typical.   
 
 
IV. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE FOOD LAWS 
So far I have argued that the literary form of the biblical food laws should be understood 
as narrative ‘paradigm cases.’ This brings us, then, to our final question: what is the 
social function of the biblical food laws?79 What is the purpose of a compositional 
structure of paradigm cases and binary oppositions? These questions can, of course, be 
located in an extremely broad discussion regarding the possible range of social 
functions that different biblical laws may have entailed. Can we be more precise 
regarding the social function of Lev 11 and Deut 14? 
 
I believe we can. We noted, in I above, the use of paradigm cases in Exod 22:2-3 (MT 
22:1-2). As Jackson sees, Exod 22:2-3 (MT 22:1-2) provides a conclusive, objective test 
                                                          
79 Scholars such as Hartley (163) have proposed that the laws’ social function was to be 
“a mighty force of solidarity” by “developing deep in [the Israelites’] consciousness [at 
meals] an attitude of obedience to God.” At this level of generality, Hartley is surely 
correct. In this section, however, I want to consider more precisely the question of how 
the biblical food laws structure social consciousness to produce certain social effect (i.e. 
the consumption of some foods and not others).  
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that enables the kin to know, without recourse to adjudication, whether the killing was 
justified or not.80 Jackson has further argued that a significant number of the individual 
rules of the Mishpatim may be similarly characterised as ‘self-executing’ rules, viz. rules 
which are formulated in such a way as to reduce the need for third-party adjudication,81 
including: Exod 21:2-6; Exod 21:18-19; Exod 21:35;82 Exod 22:4/MT 22:383 and Exod 
22:3/MT 22:2b.84 Nor are such examples unique to the Mishpatim; Jackson also points 
to cases outside the Mishpatim, including redress for homicide (Deut. 19:6, 12; Num. 
35:25)85 whilst I have noted instances in Leviticus (e.g. the rental value of land; Lev 
25:15–17).86 The point about such self-executing narrative rules is that they are 
manifestations of practical wisdom. They are pragmatic ‘bright-line’ rules that provide 
an instant resolution of the problem at hand. Might the same be true of the food laws of 
Lev 11 and Deut 14? 
 
                                                          
80 Jackson, Studies, 82-83.  
81 See generally Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, 29-30.  
82 Bernard S. Jackson, “Law, wisdom and narrative,” in Narrativity in Biblical and Related 
Texts, eds. G. J. Brooke and J.-D. Kaestli; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000, 31-51, 
here 31.  
83 Exod 22:1-4 (MT 21:37-22:3; Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, 300-301).  
84 Jackson, Studies, 82-87. 
85 Jackson, Studies, 82.  
86 Jonathan Burnside, God, Justice and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 181.  
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To answer this we could begin by imagining a society like ancient Israel, which has a 
body of social knowledge about what can and cannot be eaten, informed by the material 
environment. The lawgiver has the pragmatic task of finding the most effective way of 
communicating this to as many people as possible. The legislator could begin with some 
clearly-worked out paradigms (as in Lev 11 and Deut 14, in relation to land animals and 
aquatic creatures). But once the lawgiver has established these, the rest can be worked 
out quite straightforwardly. The important thing is to get the paradigm of the land 
animals right first (in this case, the characteristics of ‘hooves and cud’) and this needs to 
be followed by the paradigm for aquatic creatures (here, the characteristics of ‘fins and 
scales’). The latter makes sense in light of the first category, but it is necessary to 
understand this as well, because the sequence builds.87 However, once these categories 
are in place, the audience does not really need to think too hard about the next category 
(the birds), and by the time the lawgiver reaches the insects, the laws have had such an 
educative effect, that, by the end of this category, the audience can even cope with  an 
exception.  The economy is breathtaking. As a way of transmitting knowledge, it is 
extremely effective. 
 
In terms of what is actually ‘posited’ in the food laws, the only arbitrary element88 is the 
first clear statement regarding clean and unclean land animals and the second 
statement regarding aquatic creatures. This is why most attention is paid to these 
                                                          
87 Cf. Houston who claims that the sub-section on aquatic creatures is “highly 
redundant” in Leviticus (Purity, 40). 
88 For arbitrariness in self-executing rules see Jackson, Studies, 83-87. 
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categories.89 It is important that these paradigms are firmly fixed in the minds of the 
audience. Once they are in place, the next case follows from them, until the audience 
reaches the insects, and then the exception. Information drops away as the paradigm is 
understood. Within a short time, you can teach everyone what to eat – without making a 
meal of it. The food laws of Lev 11 and Deut 14 provide conclusive, objective, tests about 
what is and is not edible that can be, potentially, applied by everyone. 90 Indeed, the 
relative straightforwardness of the food laws is, I suggest, evidence of the fact that they 
                                                          
89 Although it makes no difference to my argument, the order of categories 
(animals/aquatic creatures/birds/insects) may reflect the fact that land animals and 
fish are more significant food sources than birds and insects (unless they are locusts, in 
which case they are given particular attention). If so, it is further confirmation of the 
practical nature of the regulations: the most didactic teaching is given to the things 
people are most likely to kill for food. 
90 We may ask: who is the audience who is reading the food laws in Deut. and especially 
Lev. 11? The dominant view among scholars is that the audience is specialist with 
particular expertise in writing and interpreting written material. Nevertheless, even 
élite literary readers of the law communicated orally to a wider audience, composed of 
many types of people who could thus have been enabled to interpret and apply the food 
laws for themselves. See generally David M. Carr. 2005. Writing on the Tablet of the 
Heart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 111-173; Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, passim; James 
W. Watts. Reading Law (TBS 59; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), passim.  
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are directed to the general public, and not simply to ‘experts.’91 They can thus be seen as 
further examples of self-executing narrative rules in biblical law.  
And the food laws are only ‘rules of thumb.’ There is no reason why the list of 
‘clean/unclean’ creatures should map exactly onto Israel’s experience of what food is, in 
fact, enjoyable. If the priestly lawgiver is trying to educate the masses as simply and 
effectively as possible, it is better to have a few ‘false negatives’ than to have ‘false 
positives.’ In other words it is better to call unclean something which is nutritionally 
beneficial, than to call clean something which is nutritionally harmful.92 In this respect, 
too, the food laws can be seen as self-executing rules inasmuch as they provide ‘rough 
and ready’ solutions.93 A few ‘false negatives’ is the price to be paid for having everyday 
rules which equip people to make judgements for themselves and reduce the need for 
‘food experts’, found in all traditional societies, to tell people what they can and can’t 
eat.94    
                                                          
91 Albertz sees the food laws as examples of “detailed casuistry” (History, 408) whilst 
Meshel, “Pure, Impure, Permitted, Prohibited”, wonders why the authors developed a 
“more complicated and less practicable” (here at 40) system. On the contrary, I do not 
see what is so difficult about it.   
92 This would explain why, as Houston notes, but does not explain, “a number of 
relatively common food species were excluded” (Purity, 235), such as catfish.  
93 Cf. Exod 21:35; Jackson, Studies, 77-80, 83.   
94 Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 699 claims, on the basis of the language used in Leviticus 11, 
that the food laws are not influenced by wisdom teachings. The language may well be 
different but in terms of their overall purpose and similarity to other parts of biblical 
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Of course, from a practical perspective, the dietary laws should enable people to 
consume as much of what they would like to eat, from what is available in their 
environment. But a lawgiver cannot educate on that basis. There have to be clear and 
simple rules which map onto what is available for food, even though it might not include 
absolutely everything. Nor did you have to eat whatever fell within the paradigm of 
being ‘clean.’95 The brilliance of the food laws is how they strike a balance between the 
need to be edible and straightforward, matching, so far as possible, normal eating 
practice and hallowing the mundane. The food laws do not therefore present 
themselves as fictional or utopian. On the contrary, they consist of a rationalising 
structure of paradigm cases and binary oppositions which is pragmatic and easy to 
teach.   
 
In this way, the entire substantial content and compositional strategy of the biblical 
food laws can be seen as an exercise and an education in practical wisdom. Their genius 
is that they are so practically useful. Their didactic strength is such that the audience 
can reel off any creature and be able to tell, instantly, whether it is clean or ‘unclean.’96 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
law, which are concerned with mediating practical wisdom, I believe it is not correct to 
claim that these texts are immune from wisdom influence.   
95 The designation of paradigm clean creatures could well have been broader than 
cultural practice. Donkeys, apparently, were clean, though there is no particular reason 
to think people in biblical Israel ate them.  
96 This legislative and literary achievement is all the more remarkable in the light of the 
difficulties we have, in modern society, of communicating what food we should eat. 
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Imagine what Moses would have made of the duck-billed platypus – a bizarre 
combination of animal (it’s got fur), fish (it lives in water) and bird (it lays eggs). But an 
Israelite audience would have known straightaway. It is obviously unclean because it is 
a ‘halfway-house’ creature in all respects. We do not have to say, for example, ‘the male 
platypus has venomous spurs so it’s unclean because its venom rhetorically reminds us 
of the serpent in Eden.’ No. Once the audience has the first couple of paradigms, it has all 
it needs to make sense of anything. This way of reading the text goes against the grain of 
most scholarly readings of Leviticus which tend to characterise the text as ideal rather 
than normative and as lacking any basis in Israelite society.97  
 
To sum up, I contend that reading the food laws as narrative paradigms makes sense on 
a number of levels. First, it explains precisely those aspects of the text which 
commentators have otherwise found frustrating or contradictory. Second, it explains 
why certain creatures, such as the pig, are specifically labelled as unclean because they 
are examples of hard cases that enable the rules to be clearly established. Third, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Even simple messages like “five pieces of fruit or vegetable a day” are hard to get across, 
not to mention how much alcohol is safe to drink. Most people in the United Kingdom 
don’t know how many units of alcohol they drink, what is a little, or a lot, and hundreds 
of people die as a result. Even in a modern context, there is a great deal to be said for a 
‘rule of thumb’ approach, such as we find in biblical law, which people can clearly 
understand and operate, beyond the immediate case.  
97 E.g. Meshel, “Pure, Impure, Permitted, Prohibited”, 32-42 avers “it is doubtful that Lev 
11 ever served as a normative basis for Israelite society at any given historical period” 
(here at 39, italics added).  
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accounts for the boundaries of the different categories because they reflect 
paradigmatic social knowledge. Fourth, it explains the content of the food laws by 
connecting each category to non-structural materialist and economic concerns. Fifth, it 
explains the presence of ‘false negatives’ as a necessary trade-off between breadth of 
diet and clear teaching whilst, finally, it is consistent with other biblical laws which are 
rooted in practical wisdom.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The food laws of Leviticus and Deuteronomy have a different rationalising structure to 
modern law. Although from a semantic perspective they strike us as vacuous, elliptical 
and incomplete, my alternative reading contends that the biblical food laws target 
typical or paradigmatic cases aimed at a high-context society in which information is 
shared and internalised. This shared social knowledge raises the question of how the 
common environment of ancient Israel would make the categories intuitively clear. The 
laws take the form of narrative paradigms which make sense because they reflect day-
to-day engagement with the environment. The paradigm cases identify certain 
characteristics of a taxonomic group, which are then negated. The effect is to impart a 
complex body of knowledge about what can and cannot be eaten in an economical, 
unambiguous and practical manner. The laws build on each other, enabling the 
audience to accumulate knowledge as they progress through the different categories. In 
this way, the very construction of the categories clean and unclean – and hence the 
structure and presentation of the laws themselves – is shaped by practical wisdom. 
They enable people to make firm distinctions based on visual images which can be 
easily applied, at a popular level. This is consistent with self-executing narrative rules 
elsewhere in biblical law.  
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Lev 11:3-23 Deut 14:3-20 
 List of ‘clean’ land animals (vv. 4 – 5) 
Explicit paradigm of ‘clean’ land animal 
(v. 3) 
Explicit paradigm of ‘clean’ land animal        
(v. 6) 
Explicit paradigm  
(of borderline cases) 
+ examples (vv. 4 – 8) 
Explicit paradigm         
(of ‘unclean’ land animal)  
+ examples (vv. 7 – 8) 
Explicit paradigm of                             
‘clean’ aquatic creatures (v. 9) 
Explicit paradigm of                                     
‘clean’ aquatic creatures (v. 9) 
Explicit paradigm of ‘unclean’ aquatic 
creatures; no examples (vv. 10 – 12) 
Explicit paradigm of ‘unclean’ aquatic 
creatures; no examples (v. 10) 
 “You may eat all ‘clean’ birds” (v. 11) 
List of ‘unclean’ birds (vv. 13 – 19) List of ‘unclean’ birds (vv. 12 – 18) 
Explicit paradigm of ‘unclean’ insects;                    
 no examples (v. 20) 
“All winged insects are ‘unclean’ for you…” 
(v. 19) 
Exception: ‘clean’ insects 
+ examples (vv. 22-23) 
“All clean winged things you may eat”           
(v. 20) 
 
Table 1: Parallels between Lev 11:3-23 and Deut 14:3-20 (structural similarities shaded 
grey)  
 
